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Empirical legal scholarship was once a novel and contested participant 
in the legal academy. In the twenty-first century, it has emerged as an active 
and valued player. That is not to say that empirical research has replaced 
doctrinal scholarship, or even that an empirical perspective is 
uncontroversial as a foundation for conclusions about how the legal system 
ought to operate.1 The current legal landscape, however, does reflect that 
empirical legal scholarship is now recognized as a legitimate contributor to 
our understanding of law and the operation and effects of legal institutions. 
What are the signs of an environment friendly to empirical scholarship? 
One indicator appears in Professor Sarah Lawsky’s report on entry-level 
tenure-track hiring between 2011 and 2018.2 One in five candidates hired 
between 2011 and 2016 reported they had PhD degrees in non-law 
disciplines, primarily in fields that provide training in empirical research.3 
That percentage increased to 34% in 2017 and 36% in 2018.4 Although these 
percentages are based on modest annual hiring numbers (hiring levels fell 
over this period from 155 in 2011 to 75 in 2018),5 they suggest the value of 
 
 1 Clare Huntington, The Empirical Turn in Family Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 227, 232 (2018) 
(“[E]mpirical evidence does not help decisionmakers prioritize competing values and thus should not 
play an outsized role.”). 
 2 Sarah Lawsky, Entry Level Hiring 2018 - PhDs and Clinical Hires, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 21, 
2018), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/05/entry-level-hiring-2018-phds-and-clinical-
hires.html [https://perma.cc/W39M-5BEH]. The figures are based on self-reported data. 
 3 Id. 
 4 If those with PhD degrees in law are included, the corresponding levels are one in four between 
2011 and 2016, 42% for 2017, and 48% for 2018. Id. 
 5 Id. 
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a PhD on the academic legal market. A majority of those hired in 2018 also 
had clerkships or fellowships,6 which are traditional indicators of preparation 
for the legal academy, so this group of new hires has a well-rounded profile. 
Whether or not these scholars focus on conducting empirical research, this 
cohort should be well-positioned to consider and critically evaluate the 
empirical work being produced in the legal academy. 
Another marker of the appetite for empirical scholarship is reflected in 
its presence in law reviews and symposia. Studies conducted using a variety 
of methods and definitions of “empirical research” all find that empirical 
scholarship reported in law reviews has grown and appears to be continuing 
to grow.7 Frequent symposia, including annual conferences, focusing on 
empirical scholarship have been held in the past twenty years.8 Annual 
conferences include, for example, the Conference on Empirical Legal 
Studies (CELS), first held at the University of Texas Law School in October 
2006. CELS held its thirteenth annual conference in 2018. The enthusiasm 
for empirical work has also generated specialized annual empirical legal 
conferences. In 2018, for example, Duke Law School held the ninth annual 
Empirical Health Law Conference, and Northwestern University Pritzker 
School of Law and Cardozo School of Law cohosted the fifth annual 
Roundtable on Empirical Methods in Intellectual Property. These examples 
suggest that empirical legal scholarship is not merely a temporary fad, but 
rather a more enduring investment by the legal academy. 
The scholarship produced by this activity has not escaped criticism—
much of which is targeted at the law review as a vehicle for empirical work. 
Critics often attribute weaknesses to the methods used to select which 
articles will be published in law reviews.9 They point out that, unlike the 
research published in peer-reviewed scientific publications, articles 
 
 6 Sarah Lawsky, Spring Self-Reported Entry Level Hiring Report 2018, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 21, 
2018), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/05/spring-self-reported-entry-level-hiring-
report-2018.html [https://perma.cc/4C5G-4EKB]. 
 7 See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Pam Mueller, Empirical Legal Scholarship in Law Reviews, 
6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 581, 594 (2010); Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A 
Statistical Study, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 517, 528 (2000); Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical 
Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 144 (2006); Marci Hoffman & Katherine 
Topulos, Tyranny of the Available: Under-represented Topics, Approaches, and Viewpoints, 
34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 175, 178–79 (2008). 
 8 Diamond & Mueller, supra note 7, at 592 n.6 (listing sixteen law review symposia published 
between 2000 and 2009). 
 9 For extreme expressions of this critique, see Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited 
Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1133–34 (1995), and Richard A. Posner, Against the Law Reviews: 
Welcome to a World Where Inexperienced Editors Make Articles About the Wrong Topics Worse, LEGAL 
AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 57. For another example, see James Lindgren, An Author’s Manifesto, 61 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 527, 540 (1994), arguing that “[t]he net effects of student editing are biased article selection 
and a tedious sameness in prose style, a style reduced to the level of third-year law students.” 
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published in law reviews are traditionally selected and edited by law student 
editors who may or may not have any background in empirical research. In 
contrast, the editors of scientific journals10 typically seek the advice of 
reviewers with expertise in the topic and analytic methods of the submitted 
article, filling in gaps that exist even in the most accomplished general 
editor’s knowledge base. I do not know of a study that has systematically 
compared the methodological adequacy of empirical scholarship published 
in law reviews and non-law review journals, but it would not be surprising 
to find that the lack of specialized expertise and routine peer review would 
disadvantage law review editors in their relative ability to recognize 
important research questions and identify serious methodological 
weaknesses.11 But isn’t it possible for a law review to achieve the benefits of 
a standard peer-reviewed journal? Some efforts are being made in the legal 
academy to seek professional advice in making publishing decisions, but the 
contours of that process are not clearly specified.12 In surveying the 
landscape, Professor Lynn LoPucki recently concluded that despite 
numerous calls for a change from student-edited law reviews to peer review, 
“no change is imminent.”13 
The editors of the Northwestern University Law Review decided to take 
on that implicit challenge. The aim of the Law Review’s empirical issue is to 
create a forum that can both capitalize on the intelligence and energy of law 
school editors and systematically reap the benefits of professional 
engagement. The student editors at Northwestern have attacked the omission 
of peer review directly. Using the model of a disciplinary journal, they 
sought professional advice on every manuscript they viewed as a potentially 
publishable article, roughly one-fourth of those submitted to this first annual 
issue. Each of these authors received prompt and detailed feedback on their 
 
 10 “Scientific” disciplines refer to both the physical and social sciences, including, but not limited to, 
anthropology, archaeology, communication studies, economics, history, human geography, 
jurisprudence, linguistics, political science, psychology, public health, and sociology. 
 11 Although some would disagree (for example, Lindgren, supra note 9), I am relatively confident 
that a comparison of the clarity of writing would on average give law reviews the advantage. Even when 
I resist the suggestions of the attentive and careful law review editors who edit the work I publish, I 
inevitably find that the review process makes me clarify what I mean to say. In contrast, the editors of 
most non-law review journals do a more cursory review of the prose. 
 12 E.g., Article Submissions, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/ 
submissions/article-submissions [https://perma.cc/TW8J-96ZL] (“It is our practice to subject 
submissions to peer review, albeit in a form amenable to the typical law review selection timeframes.”). 
 13 Lynn M. LoPucki, Disciplinary Legal Empiricism, 76 MD. L. REV. 449, 477 (2017). Professor 
LoPucki’s prediction may be accurate in the sense that the student editors will retain final decision-
making power, but peer review in other disciplinary domains vests final decision-making control in the 
general non-specialist editor, who is informed by peer review from specialized professionals. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1232 
submission.14 As Empirical Articles Editor Meredith McBride indicates in 
the introduction to this issue, the response from scholars doing empirical 
work has revealed an appetite for this model. The five articles selected for 
the issue demonstrate the success of the result: the publications in this issue 
take a range of approaches, but all make significant contributions to legal 
scholarship. 
A first consideration for the editors of Northwestern’s empirical issue 
was to decide what to include under the rubric of empirical legal scholarship, 
a nontrivial decision because the definition of “empirical scholarship” is not 
unambiguous. At one extreme, some researchers recognize as empirical 
scholarship only scholarship that uses statistical techniques and analyses.15 
Others expand the boundaries to include attempts to analyze data for “more 
than anecdotal purposes, whether or not the analysis is quantitative,”16 or, 
most broadly, they equate empirical scholarship with research “based on 
observations of the world—in other words, data, which is just a term for 
facts about the world.”17 This first empirical issue of the Northwestern 
University Law Review explicitly reflects a definition of empirical legal 
scholarship that is more eclectic than the quantitative constraint some would 
impose. However, the articles included in the issue also demonstrate a 
concern with systematic data collection that goes far beyond the mere 
collection of observations about the world that others would include. The 
definition operationalized by the articles in this issue is more akin to a 
characterization of empirical scholarship as involving “the systematic 
organization of a series of observations with the method of data collection 
and analysis made available to the audience.”18 
STRENGTHENING EMPIRICAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Even if we accept that empirical legal scholarship has been gathering 
steam and attracting wider interest from legal scholars, how can the academy 
foster the production and publication of high-quality scholarship as we move 
forward? That is, if empirical legal scholarship is to consist of more than 
collecting facts, what strategies will facilitate substantive success? Below I 
 
 14 In full disclosure, I am a member of the Law Review’s Empirical Advisory Board and acted as a 
reviewer for one of the articles published in this first issue. 
 15 Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision 
Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 821. 
 16 Russell Korobkin, Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilities and Pitfalls, 2002 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1033, 1035. 
 17 Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002). 
 18 Shari Seidman Diamond, Empirical Marine Life in Legal Waters: Clams, Dolphins, and Plankton, 
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 803, 805. 
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describe several key markers of a healthy empirical research enterprise, 
indicators that are reflected in the articles appearing in this issue. 
A. Transparency 
Armchair-based claims arising from intuitive or purely theory-based 
assumptions, however brilliant or insightful, are the antithesis of conclusions 
based on empirically grounded evidence.19 The distinction is that we may 
agree that a non-empirical claim is accurate (e.g., “The United States is 
advantaged by the free speech provisions of the First Amendment”), but 
without inserting and measuring specific indicators that operationalize what 
is meant by “advantaged” and designing a study that tests the claim as 
operationalized, there is no way to evaluate the accuracy of the claim beyond 
checking for agreement with the views of other scholars. And even if we find 
consistency, all of those sources may be inaccurate, but there is no way to 
know. One alluring, but problematic, characteristic of nonempirical claims 
is that they are challenging to resist because it is hard to produce contrary 
evidence as opposed to mere disagreement. In contrast, an empirical claim is 
vulnerable to contrary evidence. 
We have a variety of tools and methodological criteria that enable us to 
probe and challenge the trustworthiness of empirically based claims. As with 
nonempirical claims, evidence that results replicate across sources is an 
important cue to the robustness of a claim. Consistency across studies, 
particularly those showing convergent validity by producing similar results 
from studies using different methodological approaches, is one source of 
support, but it is not the only one. A piece of good empirical scholarship not 
only presents the results but also reveals as fully as possible the methods 
used to obtain those results.20 Disclosure can take several forms, depending 
on the nature of the data collection. When an author justifies an empirical 
claim based on an original dataset the author has developed, greater detail is 
required because the reader has no reference point other than the article itself. 
Thus, the report of a brief online experimental study can and should provide 
an appendix containing the full text of the scenarios that respondents viewed. 
Where space is limited, the reader can be directed to a website that contains 
that information. For example, Francis Shen provided both sources in a study 
 
 19 This distinction is not new. See, e.g., Paul E. Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions: Some 
Reflections of a Clinical Psychologist, 27 J. SOC. ISSUES 65, 66 (1971). 
 20 Promises of confidentiality required for access may on occasion limit the researcher’s ability to 
disclose some features of the data collection. 
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of racial bias in which he asked participants to read short vignettes about 
criminal defendants and assess the mental states of defendants.21 
When the author is analyzing results from an existing dataset, the author 
should provide enough information to direct the reader to that source and 
describe how the data obtained from it were analyzed. This form of 
transparency is reflected in the detailed descriptions of the datasets used in 
this issue by Jonathan Ashtor22 and Sarath Sanga.23 Ashtor, studying the 
relationship among the information content of a patent’s disclosure, patent 
validity, and technological impact, began with a dataset of patent cases in 
which a decision on liability or infringement was rendered at trial or on 
summary judgment in U.S. federal district courts between 2004 and 2011.24 
His article describes the source of his dataset and specifies the basis on which 
cases were not included in his analysis (i.e., in which rulings did not address 
validity).25 Similarly, Sanga studied the pervasiveness of employment 
arbitration by drawing contracts from the set of required filings submitted to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission by all U.S. public companies 
between 1996 and 2016.26 He provides the publicly available source of the 
filings and describes the selection criteria he used—the SEC’s unique code 
that identifies material contracts—to identify the relevant 800,000 contracts 
he analyzed.27 
The optimal version of the author’s description of the dataset supplies 
the reader with sufficient information to replicate the results (if they are 
replicable). Indeed, the failure of attempts at replication has recently raised 
serious doubts about some of the empirical findings in psychology and other 
fields.28 
This ideal level of disclosure that enables follow-up research to 
precisely replicate the results of the earlier study has some limits. When a 
researcher must promise confidentiality as a condition of access, as in this 
issue’s ethnographic study in a prosecutor’s office by Anna Offit,29 
transparency must take a different form. Documenting fully the 
 
 21 Francis X. Shen, Minority Mens Rea: Racial Bias and Criminal Mental States, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 
1007 app. B (2017), available at http://www.fxshen.com/Shen_2017_MinorityMensRea_AppendixB-
ScenarioText.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK9X-G39U] (presenting the full text of experimental scenarios). 
 22 Jonathan H. Ashtor, Does Patented Information Promote the Progress of Techology?, 113 NW. U. 
L. REV. 943 (2019). 
 23 Sarath Sanga, A New Strategy for Regulating Arbitration, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1121 (2019). 
 24 Ashtor, supra note 22, at 963–66. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Sanga, supra note 23, at 1150–51. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See Ed Yong, Bad Copy, 485 NATURE 298 (2012). 
 29 Anna Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1071 (2019). 
113:1229 (2019) Empirical Legal Scholarship 
1235 
characteristics of the site and the methods of data collection, and 
acknowledging the features of the setting and its occupants that may be 
situation- or institution-specific, can enable future researchers to test the 
boundaries of the reported findings. Offit, for example, reports that the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office she studied was located in a district that contained a mix 
of rural and urban counties with a caseload that was “characteristic of offices 
in numerous federal jurisdictions across the country,”30 but she also signals 
that the office conformed to a stricter internal policy on disclosures to grand 
jurors than that mandated by the Department of Justice31 and explicitly 
invites further research in state, as opposed to federal, prosecutors’ offices 
to test the more general applicability of her findings.32 
B. Acknowledging Limitations 
It is very tempting to look past limitations in interpreting what the 
results of any empirical study can reveal. Like confirmation bias, which leads 
all of us, including scholars as well as police investigators, to look for 
evidence supporting our initial hunch or hypothesis,33 we have a natural 
tendency to draw larger implications from our own empirical findings—an 
incentive to view what we have produced as more important than the data on 
their own warrant. This tendency can lead legal scholars (and law review 
editors) to look for and promote larger implications of the work they submit 
and accept for publication than the findings actually justify. Restraint and 
humility are worth cultivating, as few studies can cover all bases and address 
all potential weaknesses. Acknowledging potential limitations of empirical 
findings and cabining what implications can be confidently drawn are 
hallmarks of trustworthy reporting. For example, in reporting on her 
observations of the behavior of prosecutors and her interviews with them, 
Anna Offit describes how prosecutorial decision-making occurs in the 
shadow of prosecutors’ expectations about what a jury would do with a 
case.34 She explicitly resists the temptation to claim that the contours of the 
expectations she identifies (e.g., how a jury will react to the character of 
witnesses, defendants, and victims) describe what jurors actually do.  
Peer review provides an important check on the tendency to overclaim, 
whether explicitly or implicitly. It can do more than screen out submitted 
manuscripts that make unrealistic claims. It can also call on an author to 
 
 30 Id. at 1088. 
 31 Id. at 1091. 
 32 Id. at 1088. 
 33 Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, 49 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 259, 269 (1998). 
 34 Offit, supra note 29. 
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produce additional data to support a claim. For example, Mary Rose, Marc 
Musick, and I submitted a manuscript to the Journal of Empirical Legal 
Studies describing a survey of a random sample of Texas respondents that 
included questions on their lifetime experience with the jury system.35 We 
found, after controlling for age, no underrepresentation of African 
Americans or other minorities on whether the respondent reported having 
ever served on a jury. Reviewers (and the authors) were somewhat surprised 
at this finding, and the editor and reviewers wondered whether it would 
generalize beyond the Texas sample covered in this survey. We were able to 
respond with supplemental data from a Field Poll survey conducted in 
California that included a question on lifetime jury service and replicated the 
finding, providing the needed evidence to demonstrate that the initial finding 
was not idiosyncratic.36 
The authors of a peer-reviewed empirical article typically explicitly 
acknowledge, and reviewers and editors often require them to specify, 
limitations on their claims. Authors, for example, may specify that the data 
have weaknesses that the reader should consider in crediting the results or at 
least in concluding that the results will generalize to other populations or 
situations. In the Rose et al. article, we acknowledged some potential 
idiosyncrasies of Texas with respect to some of the characteristics we found 
were significant predictors of jury service (e.g., state nativity)37 and pointed 
out distinctions between aggregate and trial-specific results: “[A]lthough 
race did not predict individuals’ lifetime jury participation, these results do 
not address the objections to unrepresentative panels and biases in the 
selection process that are legally and morally illegitimate even when they 
cancel each other out.”38 These specifications not only provide a more 
accurate characterization of the results but also offer guidance to scholars 
who may build on the results in designing future research, as well as provide 
a warning to policymakers who might be inclined to take empirical findings 
into account. Law review authors and editors should recognize that 
acknowledged limitations do not detract from the genuine advance in 
knowledge an article may contain. 
 
 35 Mary R. Rose, Shari Seidman Diamond & Marc A. Musick, Selected to Serve: An Analysis of 
Lifetime Jury Participation, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 33, 38 (2012). As a coauthor, I had access to 
the exchange between the authors and editor, in addition to copies of the reviews. 
 36 Id. at 45–47. 
 37 Id. at 51. 
 38 Id. at 50. 
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C. Taking Measurement and Design Seriously 
It is tempting in the day of big data simply to greet eagerly a readily 
available dataset that includes a large sample and many measures, and to 
neglect a careful evaluation of the data collection that produced this easily 
accessible data. Similarly, a standard methodology used in prior research 
may offer a comfortable path to designing a new study without having to 
reinvent the wheel. Questions about the construct validity of a measure as 
designed (e.g., Does speed of responding reflect the confidence level of the 
respondent?) as well as evidence about the accuracy of the initial data entry 
require attention from authors, reviewers, and editors. Issa Kohler-
Hausmann in this issue revisits standard ways of conceptualizing and 
measuring racial discrimination, including the widely accepted research 
designs used to detect discrimination.39 She thus raises questions about both 
the definition and the measurement of discrimination. In particular, she 
points out the incompleteness of what we can learn about discrimination 
from audit studies that attempt to hold all factors except race constant (e.g., 
Devah Pager’s audit study matching job applicants on age, race, physical 
appearance, and general style of self-presentation to study the effects of race 
and felony drug convictions on willingness to hire similarly qualified job 
applicants).40 She urges a more context-based understanding of racial (and 
gender) discrimination that takes into account social meanings.41 Such 
critical looks at design and measurement are crucial to building a robust 
foundation for empirical legal scholarship. 
Sarath Sanga’s study of arbitration contracts provides an elegant 
example of what norms of transparency and attention to measurement can 
add to that foundation.42 His empirical analysis of the contracts in his study 
reveals that employment contracts are common, and are disproportionately 
likely to contain arbitration clauses, relative to the other fourteen types of 
contracts he examined.43 He used machine coding to identify the arbitration 
contracts, but he did not stop there: he conducted a human-coded audit of a 
sample of randomly selected contracts in his dataset to ensure that the 
arbitration clauses were successfully identified by the machine procedure.44 
 
 39 Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Eddie Murphy and the Dangers of Counterfactual Causal Thinking About 
Detecting Racial Discrimination, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1163 (2019). 
 40 Id. at 1208 (discussing DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA 
OF MASS INCARCERATION (2007)). 
 41 Id. at 1205–06. 
 42 Sanga, supra note 23. 
 43 Id. at 1151 tbl.2. 
 44 Id. at 1151. 
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They were (99.3% were successfully coded).45 The attention to measurement 
reflected here also revealed an important obstacle that a machine-coded 
approach may encounter. His attempt to identify noncompete provisions in 
the contracts did not succeed in reliably identifying those contracts.46 He 
suggests that the specificity of a category will determine how susceptible it 
is likely to be to machine-coding: the most specific and the most general 
categories are the easiest to identify, whereas the midlevel categories are 
harder, but more important. By presenting this example of a failed 
measurement effort and discussing its implications, Sanga sets the agenda 
for scholars who want to advance methods of capturing concepts not 
currently subject to easy machine-coding. 
D. Multiple Methods 
When results from different empirical studies using different measures 
and research designs converge, our confidence in the reliability and validity 
of the results appropriately increases. For example, in studying jury 
composition in civil trials in Arizona, I, along with my colleagues Mary Rose 
and Beth Murphy, found a substantial representation of jurors with relevant 
occupational expertise (e.g., a nurse in a malpractice case, an engineer in a 
vehicular tort case).47 Was this idiosyncratic? Simply a matter of bad 
lawyering? According to popular belief, attorneys for one side or another 
inevitably remove such jurors. We followed up with a survey of the members 
of a prestigious group of experienced trial attorneys and asked about the 
composition of the jury in their last trial and the nature of the case. We 
replicated our finding that “expert” jurors were not systematically removed, 
and in some cases appeared to be favored.48 In retrospect, we think we have 
an explanation for the result: jurors with case-relevant substantive expertise 
are retained when both parties believe that the facts favor them. 
Within one investigation, a researcher can also take advantage of 
multiple methods to build a model of the behavior at issue and test its 
consistency from different vantage points. In her study of prosecutorial 
decision-making, with Institutional Review Board approval, Anna Offit 
conducted semi-structured interviews with 133 Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and 
also participated in jury selection proceedings and case preparation meetings, 
allowing her to observe prosecutor behavior and discussions about jury 
 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 1152. 
 47 Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Embedded Experts on Real Juries: A 
Delicate Balance, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 885, 890 (2014). 
 48 Id. at 900–02. 
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selection and related case preparation in their natural context.49 This research 
strategy enabled her to use the observations as a check on what prosecutors 
were telling her in the interviews and to use the interviews to check on the 
meaning of the behavior she was seeing. The result is a rich description of 
patterns in the beliefs, and variations in belief, that prosecutors express about 
imagined jury behavior as an ethical resource in deciding the fairness of 
prosecuting a case. 
In some fields, journals expect that a manuscript will report on multiple 
studies. If the separate studies replicate key findings using the same method, 
the additional research findings provide evidence for the reliability of the 
results. If the separate studies replicate key findings using different methods, 
this replication in addition supports the validity of the findings. Such 
multistudy manuscripts may entail significant extra cost, however, 
particularly when the cost of the original data collection for one study is high. 
Few law schools currently provide the infrastructure to support the 
multistudy activities that are the norm in the traditional laboratory 
environments in the sciences. As a result, manuscripts that contain cross-
study replication in empirical legal scholarship may be less common than in 
some other fields, unless the methodology used is a brief vignette 
administered to online respondents50 or draws on easily accessible data sets. 
E. The Promise of Collaboration 
Scholars often tout the benefits of collaboration and predict that 
increased collaboration will accompany the rise of empirical scholarship in 
the legal academy.51 In light of these claims, it may be surprising that all five 
of the articles in this inaugural empirical legal scholarship issue of the 
Northwestern University Law Review are single-authored publications. The 
absence of multiauthor publications in this issue, as compared with the 
coauthorship rate in the seventeen articles published in the two issues of the 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (JELS) in the second half of 2018, 
presents a stark difference. Only four of the seventeen published in JELS 
were sole-authored, five had two authors, and eight had three authors. 
Although this is a comparison based on small samples, there are a few 
reasons why the pattern may be more than a fluke. First, three of the five 
authors in this issue of the Law Review have both JD and PhD degrees, 
bringing both legal and nonlegal disciplinary expertise to their work, and 
 
 49 Offit, supra note 29, at 1084–88. 
 50 Krin Irvine, David A. Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Law and Psychology Grows Up, Goes 
Online, and Replicates, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 320, 320–21 (2018). 
 51 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 908 (2011); Diamond, supra 
note 18, at 817. 
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perhaps reducing the need for collaborators. Second, as is common in legal 
scholarship, all of the authors in this issue offer thanks to a number of other 
scholars who provided input on the work or to participants at workshops 
where they presented a draft of the manuscript. This scholarly tradition at 
law schools, which in my view is highly desirable, is not the norm outside 
the legal academy, where papers submitted for publication are less likely to 
be circulated or workshopped in advance of publication. A third possible 
explanation is that three of the authors whose work appears in this issue are 
relatively junior scholars in the academy. Despite the synergy that 
collaboration can stimulate, faculties all too often use the easy way to 
identify a scholar’s contributions: they give disproportionate weight to sole-
authored publications. That bias continues to be an obstacle to collaboration. 
We will have to wait to see what the future holds, but if the legal academy 
wants empirical legal scholarship to flourish, it would do well to adopt a 
friendly posture toward collaboration to accompany its welcoming stance 
toward JD–PhD training. Although transaction costs are associated with any 
collaboration, the extra years of JD–PhD schooling impose costs as well. 
Collaboration by researchers with different disciplinary backgrounds as well 
as interdisciplinary training in a single scholar can maximize the vision 
reflected in empirical legal scholarship. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The scholarship represented in this first annual empirical issue of the 
Northwestern University Law Review reflects the wide range of methods that 
can be used to study law and legal institutions—from ethnography (Offit) to 
machine-coded archival analysis (Sanga), from secondary analysis of 
historical materials using a new theoretical perspective (Bernstein) to a 
creative combination of information on the same cases obtained from 
multiple sources (Ashtor). Despite the diversity of these methodological 
approaches, all of these articles have one crucial feature in common: they 
use those methods to tackle important empirical questions. Similarly, in the 
fifth article, Kohler-Hausmann wrestles with central conceptual and 
methodological issues that arise when we attempt to define and measure 
discrimination. In an age of easy low-cost access to many types of data, it 
may be tempting to let ease of data collection guide the nature of the research, 
to gather low-hanging fruit readily available on trivial topics. The articles 
published in this issue represent a very different, albeit more laborious, 
question-driven form of inquiry. 
By enlisting professional peer review, the editors of this inaugural 
empirical issue of the Law Review have addressed directly a key criticism 
that has traditionally undermined the quality, and perceived quality, of 
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empirical work published in student-edited law reviews. The enthusiastic 
scholarly response from those submitting manuscripts for consideration, and 
from the reviewers who provided feedback to the authors and editors, bodes 
well for the future. Serious empirical research is hard, and it takes a genuine 
community to produce an issue like this one. The investment pays off in the 
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